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Recent Cases
FEImuL CovRTs-DIEsT Ju SDICrION-AmOuNT IN CONmOvERSY-
Defendant filed a claim with the Texas Industrial Accident Board
[hereinafter referred to as Board] against his employer and plaintiff,
the employer's insurer. Maximum recovery permitted for defendant's
alleged injury was $14,035;2 defendant was awarded $1,050. Plaintiff,
alleging that defendant was claiming and would claim $14,035, filed
this diversity action in federal district court3 asking that the $1,050
award be set aside.4 Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that
the matter in controversy was $1,050 and not $14,035.r At the same
time defendant filed a compulsory counterclaim for $14,035.6 The
district court granted the motion to dismiss, but was reversed by the
Court of Appeals.7 Held: Affirmed. Once action is brought to set
aside the Board's award, the award is binding on neither party; the
amount in controversy is defendant's claim of $14,035 regardless of
the party initiating the action. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367
U.S. 348 (1961) (four Justices dissenting).
The generally accepted rule is that the amount in controversy
required for federal diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim cannot
be satisfied by defendant's counterclaim.8 Mr. Justice Clark, dissent-
1 The claim was filed pursuant to the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law,
Tex. Ann. Stat. arts. 8306-09 (Vernon 1961).
2 Tex. Ann. Stat. art. 8306, §10 (Vernon 1961).
3 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) (1958) provides that
The district courts shall ave original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 . . . and
is between-(1) citizens of different states.4 Tex. Ann. Stat. art. 8307, §5 (Vernon 1961) authorizes a suit de novo by
either party to set aside an award of the Board.
5 Jurisdiction was also contested on two other grounds: (1) By amendment,
28 U.S.C. §1445 (1958), withdrew federal district court removal jurisdiction
over suits arising under state workmen's compensation laws. Thus defendant
argued that it was reasonable to presume that Congress intended to prevent work-
men's compensation cases from being brought originally in federal courts, and(2) this case is an appeal from a state administrative hearing over which the
federal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction. The first argument produces a stale-
mate: Congress could easily have completely withdrawn federal court jurisdiction
over workmen's compensation cases at the same time removal jurisdiction was
withdrawn. The second argument flies in the face of the statutory de novo
designation of an action to set aside an award of the Board. This comment,
then, is devoted to an analysis of the amount in controversy question.6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) requires the filing of a counterclaim arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the adversary's claim.
7Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1960).
s See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283
(1938); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936);
(Continued on next page)
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ing, believed the Court was departing from this rule.9 While it may
appear from a cursory examination of the Court's opinion that an ex-
ception to the rule was created, close analysis demonstrates that the
rule remains intact.
The Texas Workmen's Compensation Law provides for an action
de novo to set aside an award of the Board.'0 Such an action places
before the court all issues involved in the controversy, and in effect
cancels out the proceedings before the Board." Thus disposition of
the principal case by the federal court of necessity involved disposi-
tion of the entire controversy between the parties.
The principal case differs from the ordinary coercive action,
in that plaintiff sought to be freed from a liability, while defendant
would positively benefit from a judgment in his favor. Thus the
action very closely resembled an action for a declaratory judgment
of rights and liabilities under an insurance contract.12 If the con-
troversy over the validity of the $1,050 award is disregarded momen-
tarily, it is clear that federal jurisdiction extends to the controversy
initiated by plaintiff over plaintiff's total potential liability under its
insurance contract with defendant's employer. 13 When the two con-
troversies are combined the case has the appearance of being an
appeal from the Board's award; but, being an action de novo, it is
not treated as such.' 4
By its nature the declaratory judgment action allows a party
to accelerate a controversy. Thus it is not unusual for a declaratory
judgment action to be brought to adjudicate a defense which plain-
tiff would normally assert in a coercive action brought by defend-
ant.' 5 But to sustain federal jurisdiction over such an action plaintiff
must demonstrate an actual controversy and the risk of liability which
the action will avoid.' 6 To establish the controversy and risk of
liability plaintiff must of necessity plead the claim which is being
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Barnes v. Parker, 126 F.Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1954); 1 Moore's Fed. Practice
§98(1) (1960); contra, Ginsberg v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1934); Fins, Federal Jurisdiction & Procedure 16 (1960).
9 Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352, 354 (1961).
'
0 Tex. Ann. Stat. art 8307, §5 (Vernon (1961).
11 Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 355, n.15 (1961).
'
2 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 92 F.2d 406 (4th Cir.
1937), holding that where the validity of an insurance policy is in question the
value of the amount in controversy is the face amount of the policy.
13 Ibid.
14 Hort tv. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 355 (1961).
15 SePub. Serv. Comm .n v. Wycoif Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952).
'
6 Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoif(Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952). See also Jef-
ferson v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 167 F.Supp. 389 (S.D. Cal.
1958), holding that even though the validity of an insurance policy is in ques-
tion, in a declaratory judgment action the amount in controversy is the present
claim against the insurer.
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asserted against him. To sustain federal question jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action, the courts normally look for a claim
arising from a federal statute or the Constitution which could be
coercively asserted by defendant.". It is even more reasonable for the
court to determine the amount in controversy from the coercive claim
which could be asserted by defendant, 8 i.e., in the instant case, de-
fendant's claim for $14,035, liability from which plaintiff seeks to be
free.
It is believed, then, that in determining the rule of law estab-
lished by this case the facts that: (1) under state procedure it was
a de novo action; and (2) that the position of the parties and the
issues involved are the same as in a declaratory judgment action,
indicate that jurisdictional amount was not established by counter-
claim.
H. Jefferson Herbert, Jr.
TORTS-LAsT CLEAR CnNcE-L-r Tuer Doar.iN -Action for in-
juries sustained by plaintiff when her automobile was struck by de-
fendant's oncoming vehicle as plaintiff was negotiating a left turn at
an intersection. The two automobiles involved were proceeding in
opposite directions on the same street. Plaintiff's car stopped for a
traffic light at an intersection. When it changed to green plaintiff
proceeded to turn left and into the path of defendant's car which
was proceeding through the intersection. The two cars collided within
the intersection. The jury found both parties negligent and denied
recovery. Plaintiff appealed contending the court erred in refusing
to give instructions regarding last clear chance and the defendant's
duty to yield the right-of-way. Held: Affirmed. To merit an instruc-
tion on last clear chance the burden was upon plaintiff to prove that
the collision was caused by defendant's negligent act or failure to
act after plaintiff placed herself in a position of peril. Plaintiff failed
to sustain this burden of prooL An instruction was denied that it
was the duty of defendant to yield the right-of-way if plaintiff en-
1 7 See Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952); Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
18 For federal question jurisdiction a claim must arise under the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1958). This
language restricts the jurisdictional determination to plaintiff's complaint more
than 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) (1958), which requires that "the matter in contro-
versy [exceed] . . .the sum or value of $10,000 ... " If, in a declaratory judg-
ment action, the court will look for a federal question which could be asserted
coercively by defendant, a fortiori the court may determine the amount in con-
troversy from such prospective coercive action.
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